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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONFLICTS OF LAW
ERIE RAILROAD V. TOMPKINS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
In Erie Railroad v. Tom pkins the Supreme Court of the United
States held that federal courts are not free to exercise an independent
judgment on matters of general, substantive law, but must follow the
decisions of the courts of the state in which they sit. The significance
of the decision is becoming more apparent as the doctrine is applied
to varied situations. This adaptation, difficult enough at best,' becomes
complex in cases involving the conflict of laws. It has been predicted
that the mandate of the Tompkins case would extend to the Conflicts
area,' and as the rules of Conflicts comprise a part of the substantive
common law of a state,' they would seem to fall properly within the
holding of the case. Further, the moving consideration of Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins, that divergent results between state and federal courts
cannot be justified by the accident of diversity of citizenship, is as perti-
nent here as in other areas. A recent case, Sampson v. Channell6 sup-
ports this view, and furnishes an excellent example of the problems
which confront a federal court seeking a solution to a conflicts question.
The action arose out of an automobile collision in Maine, the plain-
tiff instituting his suit in a federal district court in Massachusetts which
had jurisdiction through diversity of citizenship. The question involving
a choice of law was the incidence of the burden of proving contributory
negligence. The district court ruled that this question involved a matter
of substance governed by the lex loci delictg, although the Massachusetts
courts class it as procedural and consider it controlled by the lex fori.' In
applying the Maine law, ' the district court then put the burden of proof
'304 U.S. 64, SS Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 3388, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
"For a consideration of the instances in which the Tompkins case has been applied,
:ee Dye, Dvclopmcnt of the Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1940) 5 Mo. L.
RLr'. 393.
a Stearn, Erie R. R. v. Tompkins: One Year After (394o), 3z Rocxy MT. L. REv. I.
'Dye, supra, note 2, at 2oz. And see: Note (939) 5z HARV. L. REV. I0z.
Rrs'r.tTE.iENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3934) sec. 5.
'aro F. (2d) 754 (1940), cert. denied 6o Sup. Ct. 3oo9 (394o). See notes (394 o )
2o B.U.L. REv. S66, (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. IOO, (1940) 63 HARV. L. REv. 1393.
'The report of the district court [27 F. Supp. 213 (1939)] does not disclose this
ruling. See the report of the Circuit Court of Appeals, supra, note 6.
'Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 6oo, 124 N.E. 477 (1919).
0Ward v. Maine Central R. R., 96 Me. 336, 51 Atl. 947 (190z).
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on the plaintiff, requiring him to show the exercise of due care. Since
by the Massachusetts rule the burden of proof would have rested with
the defendant, the plaintiff appealed, contending that it was error to
refuse to apply the Massachusetts rule on the choice of law. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the cause with the in-
struction to charge according to the Massachusetts rule, although the
Court considered the better view to be that the lex loci delicti should
apply.1
0
Conceding that the history of this case demonstrates the propriety
of applying the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins to the decision
of conflict of law questions, it will be seen that the federal court faces
problems of considerable difficulty in the application. In the instant
case the characterization ' of the burden of proof question as substantive
or procedural for the purpose of determining whether the Tompkins de-
cision should apply was complicated by the fact that the Massachusetts
court had considered the question procedural in making a choice of law.
It was argued that the Massachusetts characterization of the question
should prevail in the federal court, with the apparent support of Francis
v. uttmphrey. Furthermore, if the federal court in diversity cases is
compelled by the Tompkins case to function as a court of the state
in which it sits, the argument is strengthened. On the other hand, it
is traditionally the function of the forum to make preliminary determina-
tions in cases involving the conflict of laws.
The question admits of three possible solutions. First, the federal
court may consider the entire rule selection process to be itself proced-
ural," and so avoid the necessity of applying the Tompkins case. In
rejecting this view, the court in the Sampson case points out that it
would revive Swift v. Tyson' in the Conflicts area. The second solution
o Sampson v. Channell, supra, note 6, at 755, n. 2. Accord, that the burden of proof
is substantive, Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 2oS, 6o Sup. Ct. 201, 34 L. Ed.
18S (1939); Schoop v. Muller Dairies, Inc., z F. Supp. 5o (1938).
' "Characterization" or "Qualification" in the Conflict of Laws is the process of
defining a question according to the nature of the legal ideas involved, and of the selection
of the rules applicable to those ideas. This definition may consist of determining, for
example, whether the question is one of contract or tort, or, within these concepts, of
capacity, domicile and the like. It may also involve a determination whether the question
is of a matter of substance or procedure. See Robertson, A Survey of the Characterization
Problem in the Conflict of Laws (1939) 5z2 HARV. L. Rav. 747; Falconbridge, Characteri-
zation in the Conflict of Laws (937) 53 L. Q. Rav. Z35; Lorenzen, Theory of Qualifi-
cations and the Conflict of Laws, (192o) 2o COL. L. REV. 247. The discussion introduced
by this footnote deals with the characterization of the burden of proof question as sub-
stantive or procedural. For other aspects of the characterization problem, see infra, p. 66 ff.
"25 F. Supp. 1, 4 (1938).
"R1rEsTAamENT, CONFLI C OF LAWS (1934) sec. 7-
Ibid.
Is T6 Pet. (U.S.) s, ao L. Ed. 865 (x842),
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is for the federal court to refer to state determination of the proper
characterization, as suggested above, and to follow out the application
of the Tompkins doctrine on the basis of that determination. Still the
result of the case in the federal court may differ from that which the
state court would have reached, had it had the problem before it. For
example, suppose on the facts of the Sampson case that the state rule
placed burden of proving contributory negligence on the plaintiff, as does
Maine. Suppose further that the state court characterized the question
as procedural. It would then apply its own law, the law of the forum, "
ond the burden of proof would be on the plaintiff. But the federal court,
having found that the state court characterized the problem as proced-
ural, would be relieved of the necessity of applying the Tompkins rule,
as that rule extends only to matters of substance. It would then select
its own rule, which puts the burden on the defendant,' even though
the court might consider the question to involve a matter of substance.
This result might be said to demonstrate only that the characteriza-
tion of the question as procedural by the state court is erroneous, a matter
of no concern to the federal court following it under the Tompkins
rule.' Nevertheless, is this not one of the situations sought to be cor-
rected by that decision, and would not such a solution defeat the purpose
of the Supreme Court in establishing its rule?
This possibility points to the third solution, which was adopted by the
court in the principal case. In this approach, the court retains the
function of characterization, using the motivation of the Tompkins case
as a test of the characterization. It should be recognized that state
and federal courts make this characterization for different purposes: the
former to determine whether its own or the law of another state is ap-
plicable, the latter to find whether the Tompkins rule demands that it
apply the law of the state in which it sits.
50 RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT 0F LAws (1934) sec. 58S-
'7 Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. S07, 3S Sup. Ct. 86S, 59 L. Ed. 1433, Ann.
Cas. x916B (1916). The new Federal Rules seem to approve the rule of the White case,
yet this is only by inference, as is pointed in the Sampson case. The Court said, at p. 757:
"Rule 8 (c) [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enacted by the U. S. Supreme Court under
authority of the Act of June 59, 1934, 48 Stat. xo641 speaks of contributory negligence
as an 'affirmative defense,' a phrase implying that the burden of proof is on the de-
fendant.... Yet the only rule laid down is one of pleading; the defendant must affirma-
tively plead contributory negligence. It is not inconsistent to require the defendant to
plead contributory negligence if he wants to raise the issue, and yet to put the burden of
proof on the plaintiff if the issue is raised." Usually, however, the burden of proof fol-
lox: the burden of pleading. VI W-MORE, EVIDENCE ( 3d ed.) sec. 2486.
"' But ee Steam supra note 3, who suggests that the federal courts are not bound by
the Erie d& ion to follow clearly erroneous state decisions.
" See Cool., "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 YALE
L. J. 33; Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. Z71 McClintock, Distinguishing Sub-
,tanc, and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 933.
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But if the federal court is to characterize the problem, what is the
test of a substantive matter? For instance, the question of burden of
proof is neither dearly substantive nor procedural. As Judge Magruder
pointed out in the Sampson case, there is no "intrinsic compulsion" in the
question. If the outcome of the litigation is likely to be affected by the
characterization of the problem, the question should be classed as "sub-
stantive" within the meaning of Erie Radroad v. Tompkins, although
the state court, for the purpose of solving a Conflicts problem, calls it
"procedural."
The solution of this problem in the Sampson case suggests the man-
ner in which the Tompkins case may be applied to questions arising in the
conflict of laws that have not yet been considered by the federal courts.
The process of qualification or of characterization incident to a choice
of law consists of three steps or stages, of which the first, characterization
of the nature of legal ideas involved, has been considered in one of its
aspects, the substance-procedure characterization. Selection of the
,proper law, and application of that law complete the process. ' In each
of these stages there is a variation in decision from court to court,' and in
each a departure of the federal court from state decisions may influence
the outcome of the litigation, thus invoking the application of the Tomp-
kins rule. While the technique of applying the rule may vary according
to the purpose to be served, the pragmatic test of the Sampson case will
be consistent throughout the rule-selection process. For example, in the
substance or procedure characterization problem that court applied the
test and found it necessary to retain control of the characterization in
order that the case might resolve as it would have in the state court.
Yet in the initial phase of characterization (that is, in determining
whether the question is one of the contract, tort, domicile, or the like)
it is essential to the same end that the court adopt the characterization
of the state court. A given fact situation may present an issue capable
of different characterizations, and the litigation may determine one way
or the other depending upon which of several possible views the court
takes. ' If some guide is available, the federal court should accept the
' Robertson, A Survey of the Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws
(1939) 52 H-Iy. L. REv. 747; Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws
(1937) 53 L. Q. Rv. 235; Lorenzen, Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws
(192o) 20 COL. L. REv. 247.
1 Falconbridge, supra, note 2o, at Z37.
' In New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spence, 104 F. (2d) 66S (1939),
the court divided on the question of characterization, the majority considering the problem
to be one of the validity of an involuntary transfer of a chose in action, while the dis-
senting judge characterized it as a question of the essential validity of the contract. The
Court referred to the New York law to determine liability. Since the plaintiff would have
recovered under the New York Conflicts rule of determining the validity of the contract,
but lost under the New York rule of selection applicable to the assignment question, the
result of the case hinged upon the solution of the preliminary characterization. See: Note
(1940) 24 MINN. L. REV. 685.
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state court's view. In many instances direct authority will be difficult
to find, if available at all. It may be thought, too, that no court will
go so far as to relinquish its independent judgment on this problem.
Still, Eric Railroad v. Tompkins would seem to furnish a cogent reason
for deferring to the state court's determination.
That the rule-selection process is a substantive matter within the
rule of the Tompkins case may be further demonstrated in the next
stage, the selection of the proper law. For instance, suppose the federal
court accepts the state court's view that the problem before it is a ques-
tion of capacity to contract for the sale of land. The state may consider
that the question is controlled by the law of the situs. The federal court
may think it governed by the law of the place of contracting. 3 Here
again, if the Tompkins principle is to be effective, the federal court should
surrender its independent judgment.
To summarize the point, it is concluded that there is a proper appli-
cation of the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins in the Conflict of
Laws area, but that a successful application involves a constant testing
of the problem against the motive of that decision, rather than a mechan-
ical application of proconceived notions of "substance" and "procedure."
There is a second major aspect of the problem which is not apparent
in other fields. This is the restraint of Constitutional limitation operating
in some Conflicts cases. Although ordinarily the Supreme Court has
not intervened in cases involving what it considered mistaken application
of Conflicts principles, " in some few it has felt that the erroneous choice
has violated a Constitutional guaranty. The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been invoked where the Conflicts decision
has resulted in the application of a state statute to rights which the
Supreme Court thought were created and limited in another jurisdic-
tion.' And where the state courts have failed, by a choice of law
thought to be mistaken, to give effect to a statute of another state, the
full faith and credit clause has been used.' On occasion other Consti-
'See Pokon v. Stewart, 167 Mass. Z11, 45 N.E. 737, 36 L.R.A. 711, 57 Am. St.
RIP- 45;2 (I 97).
" Kryger v. Wileon, 242 U.S. 171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34, 61 L. Ed. zz9 (1916); Penna.
R. R. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, 24 Sup. Ct. 132, 84 L. Ed. z68 (1903)5 Allen v. Alle-
ghnuny Co., 196 U.S. 458, Z5 Sup. Ct. 311, 49 L. Ed. g i (i9o5).
'Hartford Ind. Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 54 Sup. Ct. 634
78 L. Ed. 1178 (r934); Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 28! U.S. 397, 5O Sup. Ct. 338,
74 L. Ed. 926, 74 A.L.R. 701 (x93i)5 N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 3S
Sup. Ct. 376, 6z L. Ed. 772, Ann. Cas. I91SE 593 (I9Mi). An earlier case, N.Y. Life
Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 34 Sup. Ct. S79, S8 L. Ed. 1259 (1914), similar on its
facts to the Dodge case, was decided on the full faith and credit clause. And cf. Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 45 Sup. Ct. 129, 69 L. Ed. zo89 (1915).
,'Sovereign Camp W. 0. IV. v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 59 Sup. Ct. 35, 83 L. Ed. 45
(1938)5 Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 45 Sup. Ct. 389, 69 L. Ed. 783, 41
A.L.R. 1384 (1925)5 Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L. Ed.
1089 (x9x).
64 LAW JOURNAL- DECEMBER, 1940
tutional bases have been found, such as the commerce clause.' It has
been suggested that these clauses may be expanded so that the Supreme
Court may become the court of last resort in all Conflicts cases.' This
result, if it is to follow, is not yet apparent. The extent of the use of
the due process clause would seem to be reached in the concept of extra
territoriality.' The full faith and credit clause, although more often
used, seems to be limited to those situations in which a statute, a decision
construing a statute, or a judgment inter partes is involved."5 The ques-
tion of the exact limits of these concepts is beyond the scope of this
comment.'I But it is significant that precedents exist, since diversity
of citizenship-if the Sampson case stands-no longer offers a means
of escape from the rule of the state court.2
J. R.E.
7See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 34. Sup. Cit. 955, 58
L. Ed. 1457 (1914).
'See Comments: (19z8) z8 COL. L. REV. 61g, 2 SELE TED ESSAYS ON CONST1TU-
TIoNAL LAW, 381 (1934); 34 COL. L. REv. 891, 2 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 390i Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the
Field of Conflict of Laws (i9z6), 39 HARv. L. REv. 533; Ross, Has the Conflict of
Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law? (931) 15 MINN. L. REV. 161.
'See Frick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, z68 U.S . 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603,
69 L. Ed. io58, 4z A.L.R. 316 (1923); Hartford Ind. Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co.,
supra, note z.....
'E.g., Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 139, i9 L. Ed. iog (x868).
'See Dodd, op. cit., Ross, op. cit., and comments supra, note z8.
' It has been predicted that the closing of this avenue by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
would induce a drive to expand the scope of the Constitutional guaranties. Shulman,
The Demise of Swift v. Tyson. (1938), 47 YALE L.J. 1336, at 1351. The extent of
which this expansion occurs must depend upon whether the Supreme Court feels that
uniformity among the states is more desirable on a particular question than the freedom
of state courts, in determining Conflicts questions. Those instances in which the inter-
vention of the Supreme Court has been successfully sought have been cases in which the
rights or obligations of a class of persons were variously determined in the courts of
several states; or in which the rights of an individual have been prejudiced by the in-
consistency of decision among those jurisdictions to which he was subject. A notable
instance is the construction of benefit society charters, Royal Arcanum v. Green,
Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. v. Bolin, all supra, note 26;
but see Boseman v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196, 57 Sup. Ct. 686, 8
L.Ed. 1036 (937), where the existence of a federal question was denied. This case may
indicate a change in attitude by the Court. Compare the interpretaton of insurance contracts,
Hartford Ind. Co. v. Delta and Pine Land Co., Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, N.Y. Life
Ins. Co. v. Dodge, N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, all supra,
note 25, the collection of the double liability of holders of bank stock, Converse v.
Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, ;6 L.Ed. 749 (1911), and the application of
inheritance taxation. Frick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra, note 29; Farmers
Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U.S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L.Ed. 371 (1929);
Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L.Ed. ioS6 (1930); First
National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 76 L.Ed. 313 (193z); Curry
v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 83 L.Ed. 1339 (1939); Graves v. Elliot,
307 U.S. 383, 59 Sup. Ct. 913, 83 L.Ed. 1356 (1939). It is ventured that it will require
a longer step to reach a case like Sampson v. Channell, in which no such strong motive
for intervention appears.
